from the narrow-losses-are-the-flipside-to-narrow-SCOTUS-wins dept

Last year, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling in a school free speech case that came down squarely, if very narrowly, on the side of the student. The student suing over being kicked off the cheerleading squad for sending a snapchat message saying “fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything” prevailed, with the nation’s top court finding her speech, however crude, was protected by the First Amendment.

But it wasn’t a blanket ruling on off-campus speech by students. Schools can still engage in discipline over off-campus speech, but the court suggested they were better off erring on the side of caution than assuming they’re permitted to replace parental supervision in all cases involving off-campus speech. Of particular importance to this case was the government’s interest in providing disruption-free education to other students. The “disruption” claimed by the school in this case was nothing more than a “5-10 minute” disruption of a single class over a period of a couple of days.

The lower courts are now offering their interpretations of this ruling, which created no bright line standard for dealing with off-campus speech. Erring on the side of restraint may be the guideline SCOTUS suggested, but it’s not really a good baseline.

So, we’re getting rulings like this one [PDF] recently issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (h/t Eric Goldman)

In this case, the speech central to the case was objectively far more objectionable than the f-bomb-laden mini-rant delivered by the irritated cheerleader.

For example, in early February 2017, Epple uploaded a photograph in which a Black member of the AHS girls’ basketball team was standing next to the team coach, who was also Black, and Epple drew nooses around both their necks and added the caption “twinning is winning.” In another post, he combined (1) a screen shot of a particular Black student’s Instagram post in which she stated “I wanna go back to the old way” with (2) the statement “Do you really tho?”, accompanied by a historical drawing that appears to depict a slave master paddling a naked Black man who is strung up by rope around his hands. On February 11, 2017, he posted a screenshot of texts in which he and a Black classmate were arguing, and he added the caption “Holy shit I’m on the edge of bringing my rope to school on Monday.” Other posts, although not referencing specific students, contained images either depicting, or making light of, Ku Klux Klan violence against Black people. One post included what appears to be a historical photograph of a lynched man still hanging from a tree; another depicts a Klan member in a white hood; and a third combines the caption “Ku klux starter pack” with pictures of a noose, a white hood, a burning torch, and a Black doll.

So, truly terrible stuff from a bunch of minors who had decided to spend their time engaging with each other’s basest instincts. And that’s not even the worst of it. Other posts used derogatory, racist terms like “gorilla,” nappy ass” and “nigger.”

On the other hand, there was more at stake in this lawsuit. The Supreme Court’s Mahanoy decision involved someone being banned from participating in an extracurricular activity. The plaintiffs here were first suspended, then expelled, prevented from attending school altogether.

Also of interest to this case was the nature of the account. It was not publicly accessible. It was an invitation-only Instagram group composed of Cedric Epple’s closest confidants. Of course, thirteen can keep a secret if twelve of them are dead, as the saying goes. Eventually, the contents of this invitation-only group were made public, resulting in some actual (at least in comparison to the cheerleading case) disruption.

During the weekend of March 18–19, 2017, one of the account’s followers showed multiple photos from that account to the girls’ basketball player who had been depicted with a noose. On Monday, March 20, that student, in turn, shared what she had learned with several other students who had been targeted by the account’s posts. That same day, one of the followers of the account was asked to lend his phone to a student who claimed to need to call her mother, and while this student had the phone, she took it into the restroom, where she and another student took pictures of some of the contents of the yungcavage account. Those photographs were then shared with other students.

As knowledge of the account rapidly spread, a group of about 10 students gathered at the school, several of whom were upset, yelling, or crying. Although the next class period had started, the students “were all too upset to go to class.” The school’s Principal, Jeff Anderson, asked them to come to the conference room adjacent to his office, where they were joined by two of the school’s Assistant Principals, Melisa Pfohl and Tami Benau. Benau stated that she had “never seen a group of students as upset as these girls were.” The school administrators summoned the school’s counselors and mental health staff to join them, and around the same time, some of the students’ parents (who had presumably been contacted by their children) began to arrive.

In the following days, both students behind the account were suspended before being expelled. Students who had knowledge of the posts wished to speak to their instructors about what they had seen, further disrupting already disrupted classes. Some students expressed their unwillingness to attend classes with these students and others reported feeling scared, bullied, or otherwise unable to resume their studies. A rally and an on-campus demonstration also followed these disclosures, with the demonstration culminating with two of the students who were members of the private Instagram group being punched by other students.

The Ninth Circuit says the facts of this case are distinguishable from the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision. Substantial disruption occurred. And that disruption was (apparently) foreseeable, even if the students did take the precaution of limiting access to their racist comments by operating within the confines of a private social media group.

[O]nce Epple’s posts hit their targets, the school was confronted with a situation in which a number of its students thereby became the subjects of “serious or severe bullying or harassment targeting particular individuals”— which Mahanoy specifically identifies as an “off-campus circumstance[]” in which “[t]he school’s regulatory interests remain significant.” As Epple acknowledges, he was expelled on the ground that he had engaged in “bullying” within the meaning of the generally applicable and speech-neutral prohibitions contained California Education Code section 48900.4. Although Epple may be correct that his parents have the primary responsibility for policing his off-campus use of social media, the school’s authority and responsibility to act in loco parentis also includes the role of protecting other students from being maltreated by their classmates. Epple’s conduct here strongly implicated that “significant” interest of the school.

While the Appeals Court is obviously correct it was foreseeable the posts would cause disruption after their targets viewed them, that’s not the same thing as being a foreseeable outcome when the messages were still contained by the boundaries of the thirteen-member Instagram group. So, that seems to be a bit of cart-ahead-of-horse reasoning that suggests the plaintiffs should have known it was inevitable their atrocious Instagram posts would be exposed. If it was so obviously foreseeable, you’d think even a bunch of bigoted minors would know better than to create the content in the first place. Then again, stupid people do stupid things all the time, even when the negative outcomes are blatantly obvious. The court explains it this way:

Epple again emphasizes that he did not ever intend for the targets of his posts to ever see them. But having constructed, so to speak, a ticking bomb of vicious targeted abuse that could be readily detonated by anyone following the account, Epple can hardly be surprised that his school did not look the other way when that shrapnel began to hit its targets at the school. And, as we have explained, recognizing an authority in school administrators to respond to the sort of harassment at issue here presents no risk that they will thereby be able to “punish[] students engaged in protected political speech in the comfort of their own homes.” Epple’s actions had a sufficient nexus to AHS, and his discipline fits comfortably within Tinker’s framework and does not threaten the “marketplace of ideas” at AHS.

In the context of this case, Epple’s speech is not protected. He was not making any larger statement about his allegiance to racist factions or expressing displeasure with societal changes. He freely admitted he made these posts for no other reason than to entertain himself and other members of his group — a recognizably juvenile justification for being ignorant and hateful.

Not protected in this context — which involves the recognition of educational institutions having an obligation to protect students from discrimination and maintain disruption-free learning environments. That makes sense. But the concurrence, written by Judge Ronald Gould, suggests this speech should not be protected in any cases involving students and public schools.

Hate speech has no role in our society and contributes little or nothing to the free-flowing marketplace of ideas that is essential to protect in a school environment. Just as a school cannot be forced to teach hate speech, neither should it be forced to entertain and tolerate within its walls hate speech promulgated by arrantly misguided students. When school authorities take action to root out the persistent echoes of racism that arise from time to time in American society, courts should not stop them, instead allowing racist comments to be rooted out and not deemed protected by the First Amendment. These principles apply with cogent force to hate speech that threatens to dehumanize ethnic or racial groups within our multiracial society.

[…]

In my view, civilized society should not tolerate imagery encouraging hate; government bodies, consistent with the Constitution, can and should be able to take steps to stop it.

Judge Gould may briefly refer to “case-by-case basis,” but his proposal suggests governments replace parents in cases involving off-campus speech, even when the speech does not cause significant disruption of on-campus learning, supposedly for the good of the nation at whole.

His follow-up sentence that ends the next paragraph in his concurrence uses an even broader brush. While most of the paragraph refers to minority students being subjected to hate speech (itself a slippery term with no clear definition), his concluding sentence simply says “government bodies,” which could be read to include any government agency that comes across hate speech. The most charitable reading suggests the judge is still referring to schools. But even so, this would allow schools to directly regulate off-campus behavior — something that may be conducive to rooting out hate speech but is the sort of overreach that has never been considered as an acceptable compromise to accomplish this noble aim.

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