{"id":28016,"date":"2023-01-05T21:22:07","date_gmt":"2023-01-05T21:22:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mailinvest.blog\/index.php\/2023\/01\/05\/apples-encryption-plan-is-good-but-still-leaves-some-questions-unanswered\/"},"modified":"2023-01-05T21:22:07","modified_gmt":"2023-01-05T21:22:07","slug":"apples-encryption-plan-is-good-but-still-leaves-some-questions-unanswered","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mailinvest.blog\/index.php\/2023\/01\/05\/apples-encryption-plan-is-good-but-still-leaves-some-questions-unanswered\/","title":{"rendered":"Apple\u2019s Encryption Plan Is Good, But Still Leaves Some Questions Unanswered"},"content":{"rendered":"

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from the default-would-be-better-than-opt-in<\/i> dept<\/h3>\n

Recently, Apple announced some quality of life updates<\/a> for services and devices used by millions. The company opted to give its users more privacy and security by offering them the option to fully encrypt data stored in its cloud service. For years, iCloud accounts have been the endaround<\/a> for encrypted devices, allowing law enforcement (and malicious hackers) to access content and communications inaccessible through the device that created them.<\/p>\n

Apple\u2019s announcement made millions of users happy and irritated a single federal law enforcement agency<\/a>: the FBI. The FBI has, through its directors, consistently advocated for an impossibility: compromised encryption that only law enforcement can utilize. The problem with encryption is either it works or it doesn\u2019t. Punching law enforcement-specific holes in it makes it easier for everyone to undermine this protection. <\/p>\n

So, the FBI delivered a statement<\/a> decrying this decision by Apple, claiming it would negatively affect every law enforcement agency. Despite this claim, the FBI was the only<\/em> law enforcement agency to issue a public statement on iCloud encryption \u2014 one issued by an agency that\u2019s well into its fifth year<\/a> of refusing to correct its on misinformation on the negative impact encryption was allegedly having on law enforcement.<\/p>\n

Stanford research scholar Rianna Pfefferkorn has more to say about Apple\u2019s recently announced changes<\/a>. While most of it is good, there are still some concerns Apple\u2019s statements and iOS alterations don\u2019t address. <\/p>\n

First, there\u2019s the unquestionably good news about Apple\u2019s permanent abandonment of plans to engage in client-side content scanning<\/a> \u201cfor the children.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Apple confirmed<\/a> that it is conclusively abandoning the controversial plan<\/a> it had announced last summer to client-side scan photos as they\u2019re being uploaded to iCloud to look for child sex abuse material (CSAM). That plan was put on pause<\/a> after massive pushback from civil society (including yours truly). Observers commented at the time that this client-side scanning feature, where the scanning would happen before an image hit the cloud, only made sense if Apple was planning to E2EE iCloud (since scanning wouldn\u2019t be possible in an E2EE cloud) \u2013 and here we are.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Which brings us to the E2EE added to iCloud. It\u2019s not on by default. It\u2019s an option users need to affirmatively implement. This seems like some sort of internal compromise by Apple, which announced plans to encrypt iCloud content nearly a half-decade ago, but (temporarily) abandoned those plans<\/a> in order to appease the progressively-more-livid FBI, which had just gotten its compelled encryption dreams dashed by a federal court.<\/p>\n

The FBI has proven unworthy of appeasement. It has spent much of the past half-decade lying about the extent of the problem encryption poses to investigators and insinuating that a solution could be had if only the people smart enough to make it happen would stop playing dumb<\/a>.<\/p>\n

There are still plenty of iCloud accounts that won\u2019t be encrypted. First and foremost, there will be all the accounts left unprotected by Apple customers who are either unaware of this option or decide they\u2019ve got nothing to hide, etc. Then there are those specifically carved out of this security measure by Apple \u2014 something that appears to be another concession to one particular law enforcement agency.<\/p>\n

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What\u2019s more, not everyone gets to choose it: managed Apple IDs and child accounts aren\u2019t eligible for ADP [Advanced Data Protection], according to Apple\u2019s documentation<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

That decision by Apple is a little strange. And it\u2019s potentially going to be a legal issue for the company. As Pfefferkorn points out, the UK and California have enacted laws that increase default protections for children\u2019s data. By making this option unavailable to its minor users, Apple may find itself in breach of the law. The UK\u2019s Age Appropriate Design Code<\/a>, California\u2019s similarly titled law<\/a>, and the (horrendous) Kids Online Safety Act<\/a> all contain mandates that could make this decision by Apple a criminal offense.<\/p>\n

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All three require online services to set minors\u2019 accounts to the most privacy-protective settings by default. Because it\u2019s E2EE, ADP is inarguably a higher privacy setting than Apple\u2019s standard data protection for iCloud. That seems to tee up a potential conflict with these requirements, insofar as (1) ADP is opt-in, not on by default, and (2) child accounts are not eligible for ADP at all.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Unresolved problems with UK and California law have been created. Somewhat hilariously, the conflict created between the Kids Online Safety Act could actually result in encryption mandates<\/strong><\/em> that cover accounts created and run by minors. <\/p>\n

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In bill text that I believe just came out yesterday, available here<\/a>, section 4(a)(3) says<\/em>,<\/p>\n

\u201cDEFAULT SAFEGUARD SETTINGS FOR MINORS.\u2014A covered platform shall provide that, in the case of a user that the platform knows or should know is a minor, the default setting for any safeguard \u2026 shall be the option available on the platform that provides the most protective level of control that is offered by the platform over privacy and safety for that user.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

(The bill defines \u201ccovered platform\u201d to mean \u201ca commercial software application or electronic service that connects to the internet and that is used, or is reasonably likely to be used, by a minor.\u201d)<\/em><\/p>\n

There\u2019s no \u201ccompelling reason\/best interest\u201d carve-out here. It therefore seems to me that Senator Blumenthal\u2019s bill would require Apple to not just make ADP available for child accounts, but opt them all into it, so that all children\u2019s iClouds are E2EE by default<\/strong>.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is going to generate some friction between the FBI (which wants encryption to be compromised) and federal legislators (who would have to add an encryption mandate targeting Apple). The friction will be wonderful to enjoy secondhand, given that both parties claim they\u2019re doing everything they can \u201cfor the children.\u201d<\/p>\n

Pfefferkorn says this is not the end of the questions raised by Apple\u2019s ADP plans. Since E2EE of iCloud content isn\u2019t on by default, it could mean Apple is still eyeing plans to scan content for CSAM, although most likely not on the client side. A large percentage of Apple users are unlikely to opt into encryption, so Apple can continue to scan content \u201cfor the children\u201d while truthfully claiming users (other than children at the moment) can opt out of this scanning any time by opting into its new E2EE offering. <\/p>\n

Perhaps most questionable of all (although not really a question, per se) is this Apple claim, highlighted in Pfefferkorn\u2019s excellent post:<\/p>\n

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In announcing ADP, Apple claimed that<\/a> E2EE iCloud will eventually be offered in China, too, as part of ADP\u2019s gradual global rollout.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

Sure, pal. Call me when that happens. Let\u2019s move on<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This seems, at best, highly unlikely. Giving Chinese users access to E2EE will likely just see Apple blocked from selling phones in the country that makes so many of them. It also would mean fully abandoning China as a manufacturing base<\/a> since the government isn\u2019t going to give its blessing to Apple manufacturing plants when it knows the end result is Chinese citizens locking the government out of access to locally stored (yes, you read that right<\/a>) data and communications. <\/p>\n

The timetable alone for reducing Apple\u2019s dependence on Chinese manufacturing would likely push E2EE implementation in China back for several years. Apple\u2019s dependence on Chinese citizens as customers pushes this back even further, putting it right on the border of \u201cdecades away\u201d and \u201cnever.\u201d<\/p>\n

Apple\u2019s recent security changes are still a net good, at least for users who can\/will take advantage of them. But just because the change is positive doesn\u2019t mean Apple shouldn\u2019t remain under scrutiny. Every action has reactions and it appears, at least at this point, that acting on behalf of most of its customers may again put it at odds with governments all over the world.<\/p>\n

\nFiled Under: encryption<\/a>, fbi<\/a>, security<\/a>
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Companies: apple<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n